When Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva lost the first round of the presidential election to his right-wing challenger Flávio Bolsonaro on October 4, his chances of returning to power appeared uncertain. The 80-year-old left-wing leader, who had been one of the most influential figures in Brazilian politics for decades, was facing a resurgent right that had established a formidable presence on social media.
But three weeks later, in the run-off on October 25, Lula managed to turn the election around. He secured 51.79 per cent of the valid votes, defeating Bolsonaro, who received 48.21 per cent. Lula received over 64.2 million votes, compared to Bolsonaro's 59.8 million, completing a comeback that had not been seen in a Brazilian presidential runoff since the country's return to direct presidential elections in 1989.
While several factors contributed to the victory, including mass street demonstrations, government welfare measures and increased voter mobilisation, one particular initiative has attracted considerable attention: a WhatsApp channel called “Lula's Army”, or Exército do Lula in Portuguese.
Led by Brazilian Congressman André Janones, the channel grew into a network of nearly 11 million followers in the weeks leading up to the second round of voting. Through daily instructions, campaign videos and coordinated online activities, it encouraged ordinary supporters to take an active role in Lula's campaign.
To understand the importance of Lula's Army, it is necessary to look at how social media has shaped Brazilian politics over the past decade.
During the 2018 presidential election, former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio Bolsonaro's father, built a powerful online political following. His supporters used WhatsApp, Facebook, YouTube and other platforms to circulate political messages, attack opponents and mobilise voters.
The political right continued to maintain a strong presence on these platforms even after Jair Bolsonaro lost the 2022 presidential election to Lula.
In the 2026 election, Lula's campaign initially struggled to compete with the online activity surrounding Flávio Bolsonaro. However, after the first-round defeat, the president's supporters began reorganising their digital strategy.
At the centre of this effort was André Janones, a 42-year-old federal deputy from Minas Gerais, who had developed a reputation for his aggressive and unconventional approach to political communication.
Janones had created Lula's Army in April 2026, several months before the presidential election. However, the initiative gained significant momentum only after Lula's disappointing performance in the first round.
According to an AFP report, the channel had around 60,000 followers at the beginning of the run-off campaign. By election day, its following had expanded to nearly 11 million.
The initiative was not a conventional WhatsApp group where members exchanged messages with one another. Instead, it operated as a WhatsApp channel, allowing administrators to distribute content to large numbers of followers, who could then circulate the material through their own networks.
This structure allowed Janones to coordinate political messaging on a scale that would have been difficult through ordinary WhatsApp groups.
The central idea behind Lula's Army was relatively simple: rather than asking supporters merely to watch campaign videos or read political messages, Janones encouraged them to actively participate in spreading the campaign's content.
Every day, followers received instructions that Janones described as missions.
These included sharing particular videos, promoting hashtags, responding to political claims made by Bolsonaro's campaign and encouraging others to join the channel.
The messages often came with ready-made content that supporters could easily forward to their friends, relatives and other WhatsApp groups.
Janones used a style of communication that resembled a military commander addressing his troops. He regularly urged supporters to act immediately, sometimes asking them to remain online until a particular task was completed.
In one of his recurring appeals, Janones would ask followers to help make a campaign video or hashtag go viral.
The approach sought to create coordinated bursts of online activity rather than depending entirely on individual supporters to share content whenever they wanted.
The channel also helped the campaign respond quickly to political developments. When Bolsonaro or his supporters made allegations against Lula, the network could circulate counter-messages and encourage followers to amplify them.
This was particularly important in an election where both sides were fighting to shape political conversations on social media.
According to BBC News Brasil, Janones's approach helped Lula's supporters challenge the online dominance that Bolsonaro's political movement had enjoyed during the first round of voting.
The impact of Lula's Army was not limited to online campaigning. Its growth coincided with a wave of street demonstrations across Brazil, particularly among students, young people and supporters of left-wing political movements.
Following Lula's first-round defeat, demonstrations began taking place in several Brazilian cities, with protesters expressing opposition to the possibility of the Bolsonaro family returning to the presidency.
The demonstrations gathered momentum in the weeks leading up to the run-off. Large crowds assembled in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and other cities, with supporters carrying red flags, wearing Lula campaign merchandise and calling on voters to prevent a Bolsonaro victory.
According to The Guardian, many of those who participated in these demonstrations were also members of Lula's Army.
At a rally on Copacabana beach in Rio de Janeiro, a retired teacher named Isabella Gaze, who had joined the WhatsApp initiative, described her participation as part of a broader struggle to defend Brazilian democracy.
The overlap between online mobilisation and street demonstrations became an important feature of Lula's campaign. While the WhatsApp channel encouraged supporters to circulate political content, public demonstrations helped create visible support for Lula outside the digital space.
This relationship between social media and grassroots political activity was particularly significant because Lula's Workers' Party, or Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), has historically relied on trade unions, student organisations and social movements to mobilise voters.
The 2026 campaign brought these older forms of political organisation together with newer digital communication strategies.
One of the more unusual aspects of the election was Lula's own relationship with technology.
Unlike many contemporary politicians who regularly post videos and communicate directly with followers, Lula had not been an enthusiastic user of smartphones.
However, as the second round approached, his campaign began adopting a more informal style of digital communication.
Lula started recording short, selfie-style videos intended for social media. These videos allowed the president to communicate in a more direct and personal manner, moving away from the formal speeches and campaign advertisements that had traditionally characterised his political communication.
Janones played a role in this transformation.
At one point, Lula promised to purchase his first mobile phone if Lula's Army reached five million followers. When the channel crossed that milestone, Janones was present as the president unboxed his new device.
The moment became part of the campaign's broader effort to portray Lula as a leader willing to adapt to a changing political environment.
It also reflected the growing influence of younger, digitally active politicians within the president's campaign.
According to The Washington Post, Lula's campaign increased its focus on women and younger voters while expanding its social media outreach during the run-off.
Janones, meanwhile, continued coordinating the WhatsApp operation, including a 24-hour livestream ahead of polling day.
There is little doubt that Lula's Army expanded the reach of the president's online campaign. However, establishing exactly how much it contributed to his electoral victory is more complicated.
In the first round, Lula received approximately 53.9 million votes. By the run-off, his tally had increased to more than 64.2 million.
The increase came alongside a substantial rise in voter participation, a more aggressive digital campaign and intensified street-level political activity.
According to an Associated Press report, Oliver Stuenkel, a professor of international relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, observed that Janones had adopted elements of the Brazilian right's approach to online political campaigning, particularly its use of frequent and aggressive messaging.
Stuenkel also noted that the first-round defeat had forced Lula's campaign to reorganise its strategy after a period of internal disagreements and ineffective communication.
But the digital campaign was only one part of this change.
The Lula government also introduced measures aimed at addressing economic concerns, including increased cash-transfer payments, debt relief and restrictions on online sports betting.
These interventions came at a time when living costs, household debt and economic insecurity were important concerns for Brazilian voters.
The Workers' Party also intensified its grassroots mobilisation, while student organisations and social movements organised large public demonstrations.
Political scientist Denilde Holzhacker, speaking to BBC News Brasil, argued that the campaign's ability to connect digital communication with grassroots political activity was an important factor in Lula's comeback.
Similarly, Mayra Goulart, a political scientist at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, emphasised the combined importance of online mobilisation, street-level campaigning and efforts to persuade undecided voters and reduce abstention.